Introduction
Given the deepening political crisis in the country resulting from the October 25 coup and its negative repercussions on the overall economic and security situation, and based on our responsibility as a reformist political party that seeks to sustain and consolidate the democratic transition, reduce the cost of political action, enhance the value of life and preserve the lives and blood of the Sudanese people, and pursue solutions, we in Binaa Sudan Party are putting forward a roadmap based on an in-depth analysis of the long-term Sudanese issue. We hope that it will lead to the opening of a political path that restores stability to the country and puts it back on the path of democratic transition and transformation, and above all, preserves the blood of Sudanese women and men.
Introduction
We, in Binaa Sudan Party, believe that the political process has been distorted over decades of national rule until it completely lost its validity, and it does not lead to stability and development in the country. Since the country’s independence, the political process has been governed by the rules of revolutionary action, which means, among other things, making sudden changes outside the framework of legal and constitutional change and according to the logic of force, whether popular or military. This has placed the country in a state of constant tension and competition for destruction, and intense polarization that quickly subsides only to return more severe and extreme. Thus, obtaining a share of power has become directly proportional to the extent of the ability of this or that political faction to destroy and commit negative actions, the intensity of which escalates to the point of closing and disrupting public facilities, and even igniting wars and carrying out coups. There are many political parties that had – and still have – cells in the army, and there is no better evidence of this than the historical fact that indicates that all the military coups that Sudan has witnessed were orchestrated by political forces and parties, which ultimately led us to the fact that the People’s Armed Forces, other regular agencies, and militias were involved in the work. The political and greedy for a large share of power and wealth, in addition to the foundations of strength, sacrifice and adventure upon which the political process in Sudan was founded. The country also has an infinite number of armed movements, and accordingly, during the past years, a sharp regional discourse has been fueled, which has increased the fragility of the situation, in addition to the dominance of extremely extremist ideas in the public sphere and extremely hostile to the conventional tools of political action, such as settlement, negotiation and bargaining, which has led to the emptying of the political process of its content as an art of managing the possible and a tool for gradual and continuous improvement. In addition to that, there are external factors that are necessarily known and work - with great potential - to perpetuate conditions other than those desired by the Sudanese street, which achieved the glorious December Revolution and paid a heavy price for it, driven by hope for freedom, democracy, peace, justice, progress and prosperity.
The aforementioned Sudanese situation requires a deep understanding of the magnitude of the challenges and complexities that exist and that need to be changed. This requires identifying the least costly and most effective mechanisms and methods to achieve the desired noble goals, taking into account the ambitions and fears of the parties that constitute an obstacle to the continuation of the transition and democratic transformation, and using political acumen and wisdom to buy the future instead of drowning in the rights and opportunities that have been digested and wasted by irrational political practice throughout the country since the dawn of independence until today. Accordingly, we see that the intensification of tension and the increase of congestion in light of the aforementioned political, economic and social environment, places our country closer to civil war than to transition and stability, threatens its unity and looms before its honorable citizens the specter of dispersion and displacement. Similar experiences in our regional environment are not far away in space or time, and it is a fate that no party in the political process would like, but it is likely to occur while this party or that party seeks to defeat its political opponent and achieve its goals with a knockout blow, not by points through the known civil means. Our awareness of the reality of the crisis in Sudan, and our different analysis of the entire political process, led us to a different diagnosis of the source of the disease, which is the state of our political class’s tendency towards revolutionary change and its failure to organize the rules of the peaceful transfer of power in accordance with freedom of organization and expression, the recognition of private property, and the non-infringement of minority rights. This is something that could lead our country to destruction. Therefore, we found no alternative but to take the step of forming Binaa Sudan Party as a programmatic party that transcends ideologies and adopts the approach of gradual reformist change. Since the outbreak of the revolution in December 2018, Binaa Sudan Party has provided the Sudanese political arena with a set of proposals aimed at realizing the aspirations of Sudanese women and men for change towards a civil and democratic state at the lowest human and economic cost. The first of these proposals was the proposal to resolve the political crisis, published in December 2019. The proposal was then revised several times in April 2018, before the final version was released. The economic proposal, titled the 100-Day Program, was developed in February 2019, aiming to provide an emergency economic plan for the transitional government. It was presented before the fall of the Bashir regime. This was followed by the proposals to reform the National Security Service and transitional justice in April 2019. In February 2019, the party adopted the idea of forming a non-partisan, technocratic government to manage the transitional period. It made it clear that it would not be part of any government formation during the transitional period, despite the fact that Binaa Sudan Party is one of the entities that signed the Declaration of Freedom and Change. The party strived to promote this on all platforms, calling on political parties and the Forces of Freedom and Change at the time to refrain from participating. In the government, and to be satisfied with only providing political support to the transitional government and devoting oneself to improving party work and serious preparation for the elections.
The party's arguments at the time were based on the fact that the participation of political parties in a government without a popular mandate is a practice that is completely inconsistent with the concept of popular sovereignty and the role of political parties in a liberal democratic system. In addition to this conceptual dimension, the participation of political parties in the transitional government is a source of political discord and competition, threatening the entire transition. The party clearly supported the transitional government headed by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok. The party's shadow government worked hard to prepare and publish strategic plans in all fields, amounting to 15 integrated plans, including more than 1,000 practically applicable projects and initiatives. Some of these plans were delivered to the ministers of the transitional government, while the remaining plans were delivered in full to the Prime Minister's Office. This was in addition to the positive monitoring, evaluation, and assessment of the government's daily performance on a regular basis, guiding the government to identify shortcomings and proposing solutions to the daily problems it faced. Binaa Sudan Party called for lifting commodity subsidies and supported the government with courage and clarity when it adopted them. The government found no one other than Binaa Sudan Party to support it when it took urgent and necessary steps to reform the economy, at a time when some parties were in retreat and others opposed the move despite being a "political incubator" for the government. The coup of October 25, 2021, was a clear setback and a decisive blow to the path of democratic transformation in Sudan. Despite the military component bearing full responsibility for the burden and repercussions of this coup, we in Binaa Sudan Party had expected this based on the reality of the irrational political practice and the repeated mistakes of the actors in the political scene in general. We did not hesitate to describe it as a coup from the first moments and we held the military component fully responsible for it and for its disastrous results and the unjustified loss of life. We also did not hesitate for a moment to express full support for the agreement of Dr. Hamdok was appointed on November 21, 2021, as we saw in it the preservation of precious lives and the opportunity that could be maximized to achieve better results in the short and medium term. We called on the political and civil forces to support him, build on him, and work together to improve him. However, as is well known, the political forces entrenched themselves in rigid positions, and Dr. Abdalla Hamdok stepped down from his position. We ended up with a current horizon blocked after we lost more precious lives, the daily work cycle came to a standstill for months, the economy deteriorated to its lowest levels, and the citizen began to suffer in all aspects of life. In the face of this critical reality, positive thinking, realistic dealing, evidence-based analysis, focusing on achieving what is most important, and awareness that the ultimate victory of peoples is achieved in stages and over longer periods of time, not by a knockout blow, form the basis on which we sense the risks and investigate logical options, employ the tools of politics, draw inspiration from the experiences of other peoples who have gone through similar circumstances, and study how they succeeded by following the method of gradual reform change in achieving the aspirations of their peoples, which makes us a party of construction.
Sudan is more confident than ever that addressing the current Sudanese crisis must pass through stages of settlement and mutual concessions between all parties, with no victor but Sudan, the people and the nation. Based on and based on all the above, we propose, with all courage and pure patriotism, the "Binaa Sudan Party Initiative to Restore the Path of Sustainable Democratic Transition." As understood from its title and name, which we were keen to be clear and straightforward, its main goal is to restore the path of democratic transformation. This stems from our belief, built on our in-depth analysis of the roots of the long-standing Sudanese problem, from before independence to the present day, that achieving, sustaining, and improving democracy is the path to solving all of Sudan's problems and putting an end to the reality of poverty, wars, displacement, and asylum that has dogged us for ages. It is a path through which we open the door of hope wide open in the eyes of the young men and women of Sudan for a better tomorrow, a bright future, and an embrace of life with an ardent and passionate spirit to achieve ambitions and hopes. In this regard, we present to you our map, which we believe will pave the way for a political path that will return the country to the path of transition, defuse the crisis, prevent the shedding of precious blood, and preserve the gains achieved over the nearly three years since the beginning of the transitional process in the country.
The Principles on which the initiative is based
A. Focus on restoring the path of democratic civil transformation.
b. Focus on reducing the cost of change.
T. Adopt a gradual reform approach to achieve the desired transformation, and understand that it is an ongoing and evolving process.
d. Focus on implementing the most important requirements necessary to achieve democratic transformation.
C. Benefiting from Sudan’s experience since independence and the experiences of other countries and peoples in bringing about a democratic civil transformation.
H. Benefit from the positives and negatives of the transitional period in the past two years.
X. Working to neutralize the risks threatening the transition, by recognizing the concerns and gains of the actors, especially the armed ones, including the army.
The initiative is based on the following ten items:
First: The legal framework and constitutional reference for the transitional period
Considering the constitutional document signed between the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Transitional Military Council in 2019 and amended in 2020 (the Constitutional Document for the Transitional Period (Amendment)) (2020) as a constitutional reference for managing the remainder of the transitional period, with the necessary amendments introduced to be consistent with the provisions proposed in this initiative.
Second: Constitution making
The adoption of a permanent constitution in Sudan since the failure of national politics and manifestations of the greatest failures of governance have been the most burdensome. This is perhaps due to several reasons, the most important of which are: Sudan's status as a country under the rule of law, whether independence or military rule for most of the period; the inability of democracy to sustain itself for more than one cycle after each popular revolution; and the war that broke out in South Sudan even before independence. This reflects—at least in part—the fact that the majority of Sudanese men and women, with their diverse tribes, accept the adoption of a constitution—a difficulty that at best reflects their differences, orientations, cultures, social framework, educational level, and economic background. Discussions of adopting a permanent constitution during the current transitional period, with all its complexities, are based on good intentions and a desire for reform. However, this desire is not supported by the facts of modern history nor supported by an analysis based on clear evidence. Although the previous years of Sudan's history were not conducive to adopting a permanent constitution, the current period is the least appropriate time to do so. Drafting a permanent constitution and securing consensus among the majority of the people requires many conditions, most importantly political and economic stability, comprehensive peace across Sudan, resolving the problems of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and ensuring their return to their areas of origin, and working to improve their humanitarian and living conditions. Furthermore, the political maturity of political parties and civil society components, and avoiding sharp political tensions and societal bickering are all conditions that must be met in advance. Procedurally, a preliminary discussion within these parties, to initiate a government and parliament elected by all the people, represents an important foundation. A preliminary draft is then formulated and presented to all segments of the Sudanese people, often with a consensus on a significant portion of the clauses and articles, followed by specific articles to be put to a transparent popular referendum. A realistic view of Sudan's current circumstances, taking into account the historical context of the constitutional issue in Sudan, and drawing on similar experiences in other countries, leads us to firmly believe that achieving this is not possible during the current transitional period. Rather, it will take years. Based on the above, we propose in this initiative to dispense with the idea of holding a constitutional conference during the remainder of the transitional period due to the impossibility of consensus, and the high probability that the constitutional conference itself will be an entry point for new conflicts that will increase the intensity of polarization, and will likely lead to coups or wars. Since there must be a constitutional reference upon which the upcoming elections will be based and which will constitute a framework under which the elected government will operate, we propose legally adopting the Sudanese Interim Constitution of 2005 as the permanent constitution of the country, in order to uphold the value of stability, especially since the majority of the provisions of the aforementioned constitution are consistent with the general principles and rights recognized internationally, and most of the active political forces in the political scene contributed to its formulation, provided that Article (5) entitled: Sources of Legislation from Chapter One, entitled The State and the Constitution, is frozen, due to the existence of a major disagreement over it among the components of society. Currently, the first tasks of the elected government and parliament are to complete the deficiencies regarding the frozen articles, and then we will have in our hands a constitution that is governed by It governs the country and provides it with political and legal stability – if necessary – through mechanisms and regulates the transfer of power. There is a possibility of amending some of its provisions in the future. The known civil law gradually becomes more established.
Third: The electoral process
No matter how much we talk about the importance of popular representation and the ideal way to ensure that the state is run on behalf of the people in a way that guarantees the participation of citizens in choosing who governs them, multi-party elections, built on integrity and transparency, and far from corrupt methods, are the best means to achieve this. Although holding elections with these specifications is currently considered a great challenge, even in developed countries, the experiences of peoples in the transition to democratic civil rule have proven that holding elections with any degree of credibility, such as those we are currently experiencing in Sudan, is itself a decisive and important factor in those transitional steps. What remains is the effort to raise the degree of integrity and credibility of these elections, which requires more attention than focusing on detailed procedural steps, such as giving the highest priority to holding them. Therefore, we see that it is very necessary in this circumstance, based on multi-party elections with an acceptable degree of integrity and credibility by the end of the transitional period, and on the institutions of governance of the transitional period, political parties, civil society organizations, and the international community supporting the democratic transition. In Sudan - and especially the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) - working hard to achieve this goal, as it will have a positive impact on political stability and achieving peace in Sudan, and preventing the country from slipping into the abyss of political discord and conflict that threatens the democratic civil transition and the existence of the Sudanese state as a whole. There is no doubt that there are many difficulties that prevent the holding of these elections. Despite this, we believe that holding elections in any form is in itself an important requirement for the transition, and attention must be paid because this is a process that requires continuous improvement, and this will only be achieved through the practice itself. Given that most of the time specified for the transitional period has passed in political conflicts - including the October 25 coup - for various reasons and motives, some of which are due to the complexity of the political scene itself after the overthrow of the defunct Salvation regime, and other reasons related to the political parties’ long distance from democratic practice, in addition to the caveats, fears, and ambitions of the various forces, which clearly affected the implementation of the stipulated transition requirements. In the constitutional document governing the transitional period. In order to make holding elections a reality, we propose the following: Because it includes a reasonable distribution of votes between
1. Adopting the National Elections Law of 2008, considering geographical electoral districts, proportional representation, and women’s representation, with some limited and very necessary amendments to the said law.
2. Due to the limited time and financial resources available, we also propose holding the elections without conducting a population census and adopting the same distribution and boundaries of the national and state geographic electoral districts as in the 2010 and 2015 elections, while acknowledging the existence of many problems that require agreement on specific procedures to overcome them. Voter registration, for example, where there are approximately five million Sudanese citizens who are not registered and do not have identity documents, is considered one of the most prominent challenges that require time and effort to overcome.
3. The Prime Minister of the transitional government shall form the National Elections Commission from among those with experience and competence and not affiliated with any political parties. The Elections Commission shall have complete independence in managing the electoral process, and the transitional government shall provide financial and logistical support to the Commission to enable it to carry out its duties.
4. The National Elections Commission shall have the authority to form commissions in all regions of Sudan.
5. It is prohibited to run for the position of President of the Republic, the National Legislative Council, or the regional political legislative councils under the name of independents, and candidacy is restricted only to parties registered with the Political Parties Registrar.
6. The transitional government and the United Nations Interim Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) are considering how to support the parties participating in the elections financially and technically. There are many experiences that can be used as guidance in this area. We propose that general funding be allocated to all Sudanese parties, provided that it is equal and of value.
7. Focus on adopting procedures agreed upon by political parties aimed at achieving the highest possible degree of integrity and transparency in the elections and avoiding corrupt practices, given the nature of the climate in Sudan and the fact that large parts of it are exposed to
8. Election timing: Given the rainfall from June to October each year, which makes it difficult for election teams and citizens to move, we propose setting February and March 2023 as the appropriate timing for holding elections at all levels.
Fourth: The Legislative Council
Fourth: The Legislative Council during the transitional period. Many view the Legislative Council as the body representing the components of the Sudanese people, expressing them with the aim of supporting and ensuring the transition, deciding on many pieces of legislation, and monitoring the executive government. Although this statement seems reasonable on the surface, it challenges the very foundations of representation. The origin of the Legislative Council is to represent the people, which cannot be achieved without free, direct elections. Forming a parliament by appointment is a totalitarian behavior that lacks the most basic democratic values. There is no mechanism for forming this council. Experience has proven at the beginning of this transitional period itself how determining the representatives of the civilian component in the Sovereignty Council disrupted the time matrix agreed upon at the time and constituted the first breach of the Constitutional Document and almost destroyed the transition itself at its beginning. If this happened to determine only five members, and the civilian components are at best in agreement, then how can there be agreement on more than 300 members for the Legislative Council, and the civilian components are at their weakest in agreement, fueling conflict for the period? We see this as a political and escalating crisis of the transition by bringing it into the furnace of political and ideological conflict, which is inconsistent with the nature of the transition and its requirements. Therefore, we propose the following:
1. Dispensing with the idea of forming a legislative council during the current transitional period and amending the constitutional document in accordance with that.
2. Assigning the legislative task for the remainder of the transitional period to the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers jointly.
Fifth: Peace
Achieving peace in Sudan is a top priority and a strategic priority for the Sudanese state. It must not be addressed solely within the political context, but rather within the humanitarian framework it deserves. Accordingly, we propose:
1. Maintaining the Juba Peace Agreement as an important and essential step towards achieving peace and addressing its issues, while recognizing its shortcomings.
2. The necessity of harmonization and consistency between the Juba Peace Agreement and the Constitutional Document, giving priority to considering the issue of Sudan within its general framework, and focusing on achieving a sustainable democratic civil transformation, given its positive impact on the issue of peace itself and all of Sudan’s issues.
3. Making serious and persistent efforts to include the movements of Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu and Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour in the peace agreement.
4. Forming a commission for achieving development and peace in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, composed of national professional competencies (technocrats), whose primary mission will be to implement development projects in areas affected by wars.
5. Prioritize the return of displaced persons and address their basic problems and concerns directly and transparently. 6. Approve the financial amounts stipulated in the Juba Peace Agreement to be disposed of by the Peace and Development Commission.
Sixth: Governance institutions in the transitional period
-1 Sovereignty Council:
A. Formation:
Formation of a Sovereignty Council of 24 members as follows:
- (6 representatives of the Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces.
-(4 representatives of the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement.
- One representative for Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu's movement and one representative for Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour's movement.
- (6 representatives chosen by the resistance committees, (3) of whom at least must be women.
- (6) Representatives chosen by the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change, (3) of whom at least must be women.
B. Presidency of the Sovereignty Council:
The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces heads the Sovereignty Council.
One deputy chairman of the Sovereignty Council will be selected from among representatives of the Resistance Committees and the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change, by mutual agreement.
T. Tasks of the Sovereignty Council:
The tasks stipulated in the Transitional Constitutional Document (Amendment) of 2020, without interfering in any executive tasks. The Sovereignty Council participates in the legislative task, as stated in Article 1, “Legal Framework and Constitutional Reference.”
2 Executive Government for the Transitional Period
A. Formation of the executive government:
The appointment of an independent Prime Minister who is not affiliated with any political party, agreed upon by the Sovereignty Council, and given broad powers to undertake the task of forming a non-partisan, technocratic government, including ministers (not exceeding 14 ministers), state governors, and civil service leaders, and to run the executive government’s duties without any interference from the Sovereignty Council or any other party. We believe here that agreement should be made on Dr. Abdullah Hamdok, as he is a widely agreed-upon figure locally, in addition to his international presence when he assumed the premiership, to complete the breakthroughs he began regarding Sudan’s return to the international community, and to continue the economic reform he initiated.
B. Tasks of the transitional government:
i. Carrying out the executive tasks of the government without entering into long-term commitments or plans (caretaker government)
ii. The Council of Ministers participates in the legislative task as stated in the first clause “Legal Framework and Constitutional Reference”
iii. The Council of Ministers shall work primarily to prepare the country for holding free and fair elections by the end of the transitional period, and this task shall be given the highest priority by the transitional government.
-4 State governments
A. The Prime Minister shall appoint a governor for the various states of Sudan from among non-partisan technocrats. B. The governor of each state shall be entrusted with forming a government of technocrats not exceeding (6) ministers approved by the Prime Minister.
Seventh: The judicial system
The existence of a stable and integrated judicial system is one of the basic foundations of democratic transformation, and one of the main requirements for holding free and fair elections that are accepted by all, losers and winners. Accordingly, we see that this matter should be given top priority, and it is necessary to form the Supreme Judicial Council and the Constitutional Court within (30) days of the formation of the transitional government, as well as to complete, strengthen and support the judiciary and the Public Prosecution.
Eighth: The Armed Forces and Sustainable Democratic Transformation
Based on our awareness that democratic transformation cannot be achieved by civilian forces alone, but rather that consensus must be reached with other forces, foremost among them the armed forces, we believe that the time has come to offer mutual concessions and reach settlements that achieve consensus on common ground, which will contribute to maximizing the chances of a sustainable democratic transformation in Sudan. This requires that the security system in Sudan, foremost among them the armed forces, be dealt with with great wisdom, and that dialogue with them be initiated according to clear principles based on the necessity of their submission to legitimate civilian authority, while at the same time showing the necessary respect for them and for the specificity of their military nature, in order to ensure harmony and uphold the values of joint action. Achieving an agreement that addresses the ambitions and interests of the leaders of the armed forces involved in politics, and that presents promises to develop the armed forces and care for them and their members as a priority that has proven successful and contributed to changing the lives of many peoples for the better, and to transforming their armies into professional armies that perform their duties in accordance with the constitution (as has happened in several countries around the world, such as Brazil, Chile, and Indonesia, for example), prompts us in Binaa Sudan Party to present proposals that we believe are capable of achieving consensus with the armed forces of the people in Sudan regarding the principles and procedures necessary to make the democratic transition possible and sustainable.
We, in Binaa Sudan Party, believe that achieving sustainable democratic transformation requires reaching an agreement with the army leaders that guarantees the following:
1. Providing guarantees that no legal action will be taken against members of the Transitional Military Council, members of the military component of the Sovereignty Council, and commanders of the armed forces in their legal capacity.
2. The Armed Forces shall retain the companies and trade names affiliated with the defense industries system, provided that they are subject to the Companies Law of 2015, are subject to public review, and are not subject to exemptions or privileges.
3. Protecting the individual rights of members of the Transitional Military Council, members of the military component of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, and commanders of the armed forces in accordance with the law (such as freedom of movement and travel, protection of businesses and commercial projects, equal protection before the law, respect for and protection of private and family life, and respect for freedom of expression).
4. Immediate and firm commitment to providing generous salaries to members of the armed forces and working to gradually increase defense spending in line with the improvement of the economic situation, with an agreement to set a specific, protected percentage as a minimum for the ratio (defense spending/total government spending).
The Armed Forces shall commit to achieving the following:
1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces shall hand over power in accordance with the proposal presented in the roadmap submitted by Binaa Sudan Party.
2. Supporting the armed forces for the democratic transition by committing to completely staying away from politics and submitting to the civilian authority that will be directly elected.
3. Ensure that security and police forces operate within the framework of the law, including forces involved in dispersing demonstrations and protests, and that they are fully subject to oversight by the civilian government.
Ninth: Transitional Justice
The political situation in Sudan has been characterized by instability since independence, with ongoing political conflicts. The country has been pulled by multiple coup movements that have drawn it into seas of blood and transformed it into closed arenas for killing, displacement, enforced disappearance, torture, imprisonment, political executions, and the confiscation of the right to freedom of expression. We, in Binaa Sudan Party, recognize that the basis of transitional justice is the implementation of a set of judicial and non-judicial measures aimed at consolidating the concepts of the rule of law. This necessitates ensuring that the judiciary operates in an appropriate manner that enables it to pursue cases of human rights violations and enhance its ability to achieve justice. However, the Sudanese judiciary was subjected to a comprehensive process of erosion and ideologization during the era of the defunct Salvation regime, through a systematic process of replacing the professional elements that formed its backbone with others loyal to the ruling regime and the Islamic movement. This rendered it incapable and unqualified to achieve justice with the required efficiency, taking into account the highly fluid situation of the Sudanese state and the exacerbation of bitterness and tragedies, which requires that we strive to achieve transitional justice in Sudan through a strategy characterized by flexibility, an orientalist vision, and inspiration from similar human experiences, in accordance with the following principles:
- Ensuring the independence of the judiciary and working to increase its efficiency.
- Ensuring the independence of the Public Prosecution
- Strengthening standards and providing institutions to protect individual human rights and prosecute crimes against humanity.
- End the tolerance of human rights violations in Sudan and ensure that violations do not occur in the future.
- Compatibility of national laws with international human rights standards
- Creating a tolerant and cohesive society in which respect prevails between the people and their regular forces. Based on the above, and to ensure the achievement of a sustainable democratic transformation in Sudan and in order to achieve justice, redress harm, and remove grievances, we in Binaa Sudan Party present the following vision for implementing radical and solid transitional justice measures.
1. Vision Features A. Commence work to achieve the independence of the judiciary and increase its efficiency so that it operates in accordance with the Constitution and the law, to ensure and achieve justice and to prosecute those accused of committing human rights violations individually. B. Strengthen the independence of the Public Prosecution Office so that it can efficiently direct criminal investigations and adopt sound measures to protect victims and witnesses. C. Establish an independent national commission called the “National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” composed of individuals known for their professionalism and competence, with at least 25% of its members being women. Its mission is summarized in the following: i. ii. To prepare a detailed report, within a period not exceeding one year, on human rights violations that resulted in deaths, disappearances, and torture in the period from 1989 until the date of the establishment of the committee (as a first stage, with consideration given to expanding its mission to include victims of human rights violations from independence until 1989 later). iii. To submit appropriate proposals to redress the harm and address the grievances of the families of the martyrs and victims whose names are mentioned in the report. iv. To establish an independent national committee called the “National Committee for Redress and Reconciliation,” composed of members known for their professionalism and competence, with at least 25% of its membership being women. Its tasks are summarized as follows:
i. Coordinating and implementing redress measures proposed by the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
ii. Determine a compensation pension and provide estimated compensation to the immediate families of the martyrs and victims whose names are mentioned in the report of the “National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.”
iii. Providing scholarships and incentives that include positive discrimination in university enrollment and employment for family members of martyrs and victims whose names are mentioned in the report of the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
iv. Including the families of martyrs and victims documented in the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission report in health care and health insurance programs.
v. Providing the necessary government support regarding the identification of the remains of martyrs and victims and burial procedures.
C. Establishing an independent national committee called the “National Committee for the Affairs of Political Prisoners and Victims of Torture,” composed of members known for their professionalism and impartiality, with at least 25% of its members being women. Its tasks are summarized as follows:
i. Taking testimonies and collecting information on cases of enforced disappearance that were not included in the report of the “National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” and that are treated as undocumented or unreported cases of enforced disappearance.
ii. Collecting testimonies from living victims who were deprived of their liberty and subjected to torture and ill-treatment for political reasons, but who were not covered by the report of the “National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.”
iii. Submitting a proposal for a mechanism for providing compensation to the families of direct victims.
h. The Department of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (a specialized department in the field of human rights and international and humanitarian law established in 1991 by the Ministry of Justice) shall harmonize the laws related to combating human rights in Sudan with all relevant international laws and treaties.
g. Establishing a national database containing DNA samples of relatives of victims named in the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission report to contribute to identifying missing persons.
D. Establishing a platform called the “National Dialogue Forum” aimed at strengthening national unity and enhancing the relationship between the people and their regular forces by encouraging the armed forces and other armed groups to voluntarily contribute information regarding victims of human rights violations, as well as opening windows for national dialogue among all segments of society and facilitating dialogue between all military formations that have engaged in conflicts among themselves.
Tenth: Managing the economy during the transitional period
Our vision for managing the economy during the remainder of the transitional period is summarized in an attempt to maintain the status quo, regardless of the outcome. This vision, which seems devoid of ambition, is due to the fact that economic decisions—whether good or bad—require a degree of harsh measures on unlimited sectors of the population, which requires a significant amount of legitimacy for the ruling regime. Since we are talking about the transitional period being surrounded by threats and always vulnerable to collapse, our vision is to avoid all risks that might lead to the collapse of the period and the demise of the democratic transition. The indicator that most affects people's lives, it is worth mentioning in particular the inflation rate, because firstly, it is an easy task, as the cause of persistent inflation, and secondly, because maintaining it stable has not been the only thing over the past ten years, as it is the budget deficit. This means that the transitional government has only one option to demand, but implementing it requires years of two solutions: either increasing revenues, which is always an easier option that exceeds the years of the transitional period itself! The other option is reducing government expenditures to their minimum, which is the option we recommend. We emphasize that the goal is to maintain stable economic indicators without any attempts to impose economic visions from here or there that do not agree on anything except that they all claim that their goal is to improve the standard of living of citizens.
In conclusion:
This initiative is presented to all Sudanese men and women, and to all those active in the political scene and those affected by it, with the aim of reaching a realistic solution that ends the Sudanese crisis that has reached a dead end, not to mention the existence of the Sudanese state itself, let alone how and who rules it. The initiative is particularly concerned with reducing the cost of change for the sacrifices of dear souls who have risen so that Sudan may become a peaceful homeland, socially, economically, and in time, its people may enjoy peace, justice, freedom, and democracy. It is an effort that we do not claim to be complete, but rather an open proposal for discussion and improvement by everyone. After disseminating it to all Sudanese men and women, we will communicate directly to present it and discuss it directly with all parties and stakeholders.